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Three Grotian Theories of
Humanitarian Intervention
Evan J. Criddle*
This Article explores three theories of humanitarian intervention
that appear in, or are inspired by, the writings of Hugo Grotius.
One theory asserts that natural law authorizes all states to punish
violations of the law of nations, irrespective of where or against whom
the violations occur, to preserve the integrity of international law. A
second theory, which also appears in Grotius’s writings, proposes
that states may intervene as temporary legal guardians for peoples
who have suffered intolerable cruelties at the hands of their own
state. Each of these theories has fallen out of fashion today based on
skepticism about their natural law underpinnings and concerns about
how they have facilitated Western colonialism. As an alternative, this
Article outlines a third theory that builds upon Grotius’s account of
humanitarian intervention as a fiduciary relationship, while updating
Grotius’s account for the twenty-first century. According to this
new fiduciary theory, when states intervene to protect human rights
abroad they exercise an oppressed people’s right of self-defense on
their behalf and may use force solely for the people’s benefit. As
fiduciaries, intervening states bear obligations to consult with and
honor the preferences of the people they seek to protect, and they must
respect international human rights governing the use of force within
the affected state. By clarifying the respective responsibilities of the
Security Council and individual states for humanitarian intervention,
the fiduciary theory also lends greater coherency to the international
community’s “responsibility to protect” human rights.

*

Professor of Law and Tazewell Taylor Research Professor, William & Mary
Law School.
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Introduction

This Article examines three theories of humanitarian intervention

that can
be traced to Hugo Grotius, the brilliant seventeenth-century Dutch scholar
and diplomat whose writings have left an indelible mark on international law.
Two of the theories appear in Grotius’s influential treatise On the Laws of War
and Peace.2 The third theory, while not advanced by Grotius himself, seeks to
reconcile Grotius’s ideas with a key feature of the contemporary international
legal order: the U.N. Security Council’s exclusive authority under the U.N.
Charter to authorize humanitarian intervention.3 All of these theories qualify
as “juridical theories” insofar as they seek to explain the formal legal basis,
structure, and scope of state authority to use force in response to human
rights violations abroad. Despite their common tie to Grotius, however, the
three theories offer distinct visions of the purpose and limits of humanitarian
intervention.
The first theory asserts that when states use force in response to human
rights violations abroad, the primary purpose is to punish the violation of
international norms in order to protect the integrity of international law as
a normative order. Grotius famously argued that all states are entitled to
punish violations of the law of nature (ius naturale) and the positive law of
nations (ius gentium),4 irrespective of where or against whom the violations
occur, to vindicate the rule of law.5 Echoes of this theory can be discerned in
contemporary practice, as some states continue to argue that they may use
force without the U.N. Security Council’s authorization to counter serious
violations of international law. Yet, the idea that international law supports a
universal right of punishment no longer commands widespread acceptance
1

1

2
3
4

5

Although the term “humanitarian intervention” may refer to other measures such
as economic coercion and the delivery of humanitarian aid, this Article focuses
on the narrower question whether states may use force to protect human rights
abroad.
Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (A.C. Campbell trans., London
1814) (1625).
U.N. Charter art. 42.
For Grotius, “natural law” denotes rules derived from “right reason, shewing the
moral turpitude, or moral necessity, of any act from its agreement or disagreement
with a rational nature.” Grotius, supra note 2, bk. I, ch. 1, pt. X. In contrast, the
“law of nations” represents a system of positive rights applicable to the relations
among sovereign states, and between sovereign states and their people, “deriving
its authority from the consent of all, or at least of many nations.” Id. bk. I, ch. 1,
pt. XIV.
Id. bk. II, ch. 20, pt. VII.
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across the international community. Most international lawyers now reject
the idea that states are entitled to punish one another unilaterally, based on
concerns that a state’s unilateral assertion of punitive powers over another
state presupposes a hierarchical relationship that is inconsistent with the
principle of sovereign equality.6 Moreover, the suggestion that humanitarian
intervention is fundamentally punitive in nature does not mesh well with
the primarily defensive character of humanitarian intervention as observed
in practice. Grotius’s general theory of international law enforcement is illsuited, therefore, to explain when and how states may engage in humanitarian
intervention today.
A second theory of humanitarian intervention appears in a passage from On
the Law of War and Peace that has passed into relative obscurity. Addressing
his attention to the “Causes of Undertaking War for Others,” Grotius asserts
that the law of nature authorizes states to serve as temporary guardians
for foreign nationals abroad who have suffered intolerable cruelties at the
hands of their own state.7 Under Grotius’s guardianship theory, states that
use force to protect human rights abroad exercise a foreign people’s natural
right to resist oppression on their behalf, and they accordingly bear fiduciary
obligations to use force solely for the benefit of a foreign people. Unlike
Grotius’s theory of international punishment, this guardianship theory resonates
with the contemporary practice of humanitarian intervention in important
respects; states that invoke humanitarianism as a basis for intervention tend
to justify their actions as a purely defensive measure undertaken for and on
behalf of an oppressed people to prevent death and suffering.8 On the other
hand, Grotius’s guardianship theory is vulnerable to the objection that the
international community has retreated from the idea that natural law constitutes
an independent source of authority for military intervention.9 Moreover,
6

7
8

9

See Harry D. Gould, The Legacy of Punishment in International Law 29-34
(Palgrave Macmillan 2010); Alexis Blane & Benedict Kingsbury, Punishment
and the Ius Post Bellum, in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations:
Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire 241, 241-43 (Benedict Kingsbury
& Benjamin Straumann eds., 2010) (observing that states no longer formally
justify inter-state enforcement measures in punitive terms).
Grotius, supra note 2, bk. II, ch. 25, pt. VIII.
See, e.g., Press Statement of NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, NATO
Press Release 040 (Mar. 23, 1999) (explaining that NATO intervention in Kosovo
would “be directed towards disrupting . . . violent attacks” and “prevent[ing]
more human suffering and more repression and violence”).
See John J. Merriam, Note, Kosovo and the Law of Nations, 33 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 111, 118 (2001); cf. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition
in International Law, 23 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 1, 46 (1946) (“The doctrine of
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fiduciary concepts such as “guardianship” and “trusteeship” have a disturbing
historical legacy, as colonial powers have used these concepts to dress up
their domination and exploitation of first nations as a form of benevolent
humanitarianism.10 The fact that Grotius’s guardianship theory allows each
state to judge for itself the legality of its intervention further augments its
potential for abuse. As a result, Grotius’s vision of humanitarian intervention
as a guardian-ward relationship between intervening states and oppressed
foreign peoples has all but disappeared from contemporary legal discourse.
As an alternative to Grotius’s own theories, this Article articulates and
defends a third theory of humanitarian intervention that draws inspiration from
Grotius’s guardianship theory. Although Grotius could not have anticipated the
U.N. Charter’s collective security regime, the juridical structure of humanitarian
intervention as authorized by the U.N. Security Council bears the hallmarks of
a fiduciary relationship akin to guardianship or trusteeship. When the Security
Council green-lights humanitarian intervention, it entrusts states and regional
organizations with authority to use force abroad in a fiduciary capacity. Like
other fiduciaries in private and public law, states that engage in humanitarian
intervention hold discretionary power over the legal and practical interests of
their designated beneficiaries (foreign nationals), and they bear a concomitant
fiduciary obligation to exercise this power exclusively for their beneficiaries’
benefit. These features of the juridical structure of humanitarian intervention
clarify the legal basis and scope of states’ authority to protect human rights
abroad. For ease of reference, I refer to this account — which takes inspiration
from Grotius, but does not depend on Grotius’s own natural law premises —
as the “fiduciary theory” of humanitarian intervention.
The remainder of this Article introduces the fiduciary theory in four steps.
Part I reviews Grotius’s theory that states have a universal right to punish
violations of the law of nature, and it explains why this theory does not offer
a plausible theoretical framework for humanitarian intervention today. Part
II describes Grotius’s lesser-known guardianship theory of humanitarian
intervention and evaluates its strengths and weaknesses. Drawing insights
from Grotius’s guardianship theory, Part III outlines the fiduciary theory of
humanitarian intervention and shows how the theory fits within the landscape of
contemporary international norms and institutions, including the controversial
humanitarian intervention has never become a fully acknowledged part of
positive international law.”).
10 See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International
Law 28-30 (2005); Evan J. Criddle, A Sacred Trust of Civilization: Fiduciary
Foundations of International Law, in Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary
Law 404, 406-08 (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., 2014).
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Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle.11 To illustrate how the fiduciary
theory should inform the law and practice of humanitarian intervention
prospectively, Part IV briefly sketches three proposals for reforming current
international norms and institutions. First, when states engage in humanitarian
intervention, the fiduciary theory suggests that they bear a corresponding
obligation to consult with and honor the preferences of those whom they
seek to protect. Second, intervening states must respect international human
rights norms governing the use of force — including the strict proportionality
standards associated with the human “right to life.”12 Third, when issuing
resolutions that authorize humanitarian intervention, the Security Council
should incorporate more robust procedural and substantive checks to ensure
that intervening states can be held accountable for abusing their entrusted
authority. For the fiduciary theory to transcend its colonialist past and serve as
a credible bulwark against great-power domination,13 these and other concrete
legal and institutional reforms will be necessary to ground the rhetoric of
fiduciary duty in reality.

I. Grotius’s Theory of International Punishment
The idea that states may enforce international law through punitive military
action can be traced back to Grotius, who famously claimed that all members
of international society were entitled to punish violations of natural law and the
positive law of nations, irrespective of where or against whom the violations
occurred. This universal license to punish was justified, Grotius argued, based
on the absence of a “superior” authority in international society and the need
for retribution and deterrence to vindicate principles of natural justice.14 A
state did not need to demonstrate that it had suffered any individualized injury
See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138-139, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005) [hereinafter World Summit Outcome].
12 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6.1, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
13 Some scholars argue that colonialism is a fundamentally unreformable feature of
international law generally, and of humanitarian intervention in particular. See,
e.g., China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International
Law 3 (2005); Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human
Rights and the Use of Force in International Law 46-48 (2003).
14 See Grotius, supra note 2, bk. II, ch. 20, pt. III; Benjamin Straumann, The Right
to Punish as a Just Cause of War in Hugo Grotius’ Natural Law, 2 Stud. Hist.
Ethics 1 (2006).
11
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before it could undertake enforcement action; instead, “any one of sound
judgment who is not subject to vices of the same kind or of equal seriousness”
could administer punishment.15 The mere fact that the law had been violated
was sufficient cause to support enforcement action by any member of the
international community.
Grotius stressed that his theory of punishment justified warfare for the
purpose of punishing states that violate the law of nature.16 Hence, a sovereign
could justly wage war “against those who feed on human flesh . . . . Regarding
such barbarians, wild beasts rather than men, one may rightly say . . . that
war against them is sanctioned by nature.”17 According to Grotius’s account,
any state could rightfully claim authority to use force to punish another
state’s inhumane treatment of its own people because enforcement action
was necessary to vindicate natural law.
Grotius’s theory of international punishment continues to surface from
time to time in international legal discourse today. A striking recent example
is the reaction of the United States and the United Kingdom to Syria’s use
of chemical weapons against its own people during its ongoing civil war. In
August 2013, the international news media reported that the Syrian government
of Bashar al Assad had used poison gas during an assault against Adra, a
densely inhabited northern suburb of Damascus.18 The attack claimed nearly
1500 lives, including at least 426 children.19 Although Syria was not a party
to the Chemical Weapons Convention at the time,20 its indiscriminate use of
15 Grotius, supra note 2, bk. II, ch. 20, pt. VII. John Locke famously echoed
Grotius’s theory of a universal right to punish. See John Locke, Second Treatise
on Government § 7 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690).
16 See Grotius, supra note 2, bk. II, ch. 20, pt. XL (arguing that sovereigns “have
the right of demanding punishments not only on account of injuries committed
against them or their subjects, but also on account of injuries which do not
directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of nations to
any persons whatsoever”).
17 Id.
18 Joby Warrick, More Than 1400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack,
U.S. Says, Wash. Post, Aug. 30, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/nearly-1500-killed-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-ussays/2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html.
19 Id.
20 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature
Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 316 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997). Syria was
a party to the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare at the
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chemical weapons against civilian neighborhoods violated bedrock principles
of international humanitarian law that are widely accepted as universally
binding in non-international armed conflict.21 The Adra attack also made
headlines internationally because it crossed a “red line” that U.S. President
Barack Obama had imposed against Syria exactly one year earlier, raising
the possibility of an international military response.22
Both the United States and the United Kingdom swiftly declared that
Syria’s use of chemical weapons could not go unpunished. With the U.N.
Security Council paralyzed by the threat of a Russian veto, U.S. President
Barack Obama stated that he was prepared “to order a limited strike against
the Assad regime . . . to deter the further use of chemical weapons.”23 U.K.
Prime Minister David Cameron concurred: “This is not about wars in the
Middle East. This is not even about the Syrian conflict. It is about the use of
chemical weapons and making sure, as a world, we deter their use and we
deter the appalling scenes that we’ve all seen on our television screens.”24
Although neither the United States nor the United Kingdom suffered any
direct injury from Syria’s use of chemical weapons against its own people,
both claimed authority under international law to use force unilaterally to
punish Syria’s inhumane actions.

21

22
23

24

time of the Adra attack, but the Protocol did not apply because it prohibits the
use of chemical weapons only in international armed conflict. See Protocol
for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571,
available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/280?OpenDocument.
See Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 51, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (prohibiting indiscriminate attacks and attacks directed
against the civilian population); Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary
International Humanitarian Law Rules, Rule 74 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts &
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter24_rule74 (characterizing the prohibition against
the use of chemical weapons as customary international law applicable during
non-international armed conflict).
Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President to the White House
Press Corps (Aug. 20, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps.
President Barack Obama, Remarks in Address to the United Nations General
Assembly (Sept. 24, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-generalassembly.
See Syria: Transcript of PM’s Interview, Prime Minister’s Office (Aug. 27, 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/syria-transcript-of-pms-interview.
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In the end, military action was averted when Syria unexpectedly agreed
to cooperate in the disposal of its chemical weapons stockpiles. Nonetheless,
the United States and the United Kingdom did not repudiate their earlier
claims that international law would permit them to use force unilaterally as
a punitive measure to enforce the international prohibition against chemical
weapons attacks. Although neither the United States nor the United Kingdom
explicitly invoked Grotius, their arguments for using force against the Assad
regime without the Security Council’s approval closely tracked Grotius’s
theory that “a serious crime cannot be unpunishable.”25
Few legal scholars accepted the U.S.-U.K. argument for military intervention
in Syria,26 and for good reason. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter expressly
prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.”27 Although creative interpretations of this provision
abound,28 Article 2(4) is generally understood to prohibit states from using
25 Grotius, supra note 2, bk. II, ch. 20, pt. II; cf. Chemical Weapon Usage by
Syrian Regime: UK Government Legal Position, Prime Minister’s Office
(Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weaponuse-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position (defining conditions for
lawful unilateral humanitarian intervention); Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and
the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: International Law and the Way
Forward), Just Security (Oct. 2, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/02/
koh-syria-part2/ (same).
26 For a sampling of the critical reception, see Oona A. Hathaway & Scott
J. Shapiro, On Syria, A U.N. Vote Isn’t Optional, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2013,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/opinion/on-syria-a-unvote-isnt-optional.html?_r=0; Kevin Jon Heller, Four Thoughts on Koh’s
Defense of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, Opinio Juris (Oct. 2, 2013),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/02/four-thoughts-kohs-defense-unilateralhumanitarian-intervention/; David Kaye, Harold Koh’s Case for Humanitarian
Intervention, Just Security (Oct. 7, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/1730/kayekohs-case/; and Carsten Stahn, On ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’ ‘Lawmaking’
Moments and What the ‘Law Ought to Be’ — Counseling Caution Against a
New ‘Affirmative Defense to Article 2(4)’ After Syria, Opinio Juris (Oct. 8,
2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/08/guest-post-humanitarian-interventionlawmaking-moments-law-counseling-caution-new-affirmative-de/.
27 U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
28 A few scholars have argued, for example, that humanitarian intervention without
Security Council authorization does not ordinarily transgress Article 2(4), because
it is not directed against the “territorial integrity” or “political independence”
of the target state and advances the purposes of the United Nations. See, e.g.,
Fernando R. Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and
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force except in cases of “individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs” or pursuant to Security Council authorization “to maintain
or restore international peace and security.”29 Neither of these exceptions to
Article 2(4) can plausibly be stretched to permit unilateral punitive action.
Nor do general state practice and opinio juris in the Charter era support the
idea that international custom would permit states to use force for punitive
purposes.30
Taking a broader view, resistance to the proposed U.S.-U.K. intervention is
consistent with the international community’s rejection of Grotius’s theory of
international punishment. After Grotius advanced his theory, other publicists
such as Samuel Pufendorf and Emerich de Vattel raised strenuous objections,
arguing that punishment was permissible only within a hierarchical relationship
between subject and sovereign, whereas the law governing international
relations rested on an entirely different premise: the formal equality of sovereign
states.31 By the twentieth century, international lawyers had overwhelmingly
abandoned Grotius’s vision of natural law as a self-standing source of law
wholly independent of state consent.32 The principle that states could not
claim authority over other states without their consent (par in parem non
habet imperium) thus became firmly entrenched as a foundational principle
of international law.33 As a result, there is little support among international

29
30
31

32

33

Morality 192-97 (3d ed. 2005); W. Michael Reisman & Myres McDougal,
Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in Humanitarian Intervention
and the United Nations 167, 171-73 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).
U.N. Charter arts. 42, 51.
See generally Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian
Intervention and International Law (2001).
See VIII Samuel Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and of Nations §§ 3, 7 (Basil
Kennet trans., 5th ed. London 1749); 2 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations
or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs
of Nations and of Sovereigns ch. IV § 55 (Joseph Chitty trans., T. & J.W.
Johnson & Co. 1883) (1758); Christian Wolff, Jus gentium method scientifica
pertractatum § 169 (1764), reprinted and translated in 13 The Classics of
International Law 9, 18-19 (James B. Scott ed., Joseph H. Drake trans., 1934).
See generally Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought
and International Order from Grotius to Kant 158-59 (1999) (discussing
Pufendorf’s view that punishment could only be administered by “someone
with political authority over” another).
See Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters — Non-State Actors,
Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 Berkeley J. Int’l
L. 137, 142 (2005) (observing that “most international lawyers still rely on [a
positivist doctrine of sources] as international law’s operating framework”).
See, e.g., 1 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law 169 (2d ed. 1912).
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lawyers today for a universal right to use force to punish states for violating
international law.34
A further problem with relying on Grotius’s theory of international
punishment is that this approach does not fit naturally with the core purpose
of humanitarian intervention, at least as traditionally understood. As Stephen
Neff has observed, Grotius’s theory of punishment is concerned primarily
with “the punishment of the wrong-doer, rather than with the rescue of the
victims, which is the chief focus of humanitarian intervention in the modern
sense.”35 To the extent that the Grotian theory of punishment emphasizes
other values such as retribution and deterrence, it focuses on a different
set of concerns than humanitarian intervention, which aims to secure the
safety of human beings from present or imminent threats. For these reasons,
among others, recent scholarship has tended to give relatively short shrift to
Grotius’s punishment theory of international law enforcement as an account
of contemporary humanitarian intervention.36

II. Grotius’s Guardianship Theory of
Humanitarian Intervention
In contrast to his theory of international punishment, Grotius chose to model
humanitarian intervention on the fiduciary relationship between guardians
and wards. Grotius begins his account of humanitarian intervention with the
observation that the relationship between a sovereign and his subjects shares
common features with the parent-child relationship. Like parents, a sovereign
bears special responsibility for “the support of his dependents or subjects.”37
Although Grotius expresses skepticism that states are duty-“bound to risk
their own safety” to protect a foreign people from oppression,38 he nonetheless
asserts that states may take up arms to deliver foreign nationals from tyrants
who “provoke their people to despair and resistance by unheard of cruelties.”39
Rulers who have “abandoned all the laws of nature” through the inhumane
34 See Blane & Kingsbury, supra note 6, at 241-43.
35 See Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace: Student Edition 285 n.32
(Stephen C. Neff ed., 2012) (editor’s annotation).
36 For thoughtful reflections on how Grotius’s punishment theory has influenced the
theory of humanitarian intervention over time, see Chesterman, supra note 30,
at 10-13; and Theodor Meron, Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius,
and Suarez, 85 Am. J. Int’l L. 110, 110-11 (1991).
37 Grotius, supra note 2, bk. II, ch. 25, pt. I.
38 Id. pt. VII.
39 Id. pt. VIII.
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treatment of their own people “lose the rights of independent sovereigns, and
can no longer claim the privilege [of freedom from foreign intervention] under
the law of nations.”40 Once the relationship between a state and its people has
been ruptured by systematic atrocities, Grotius concludes, other states may
use force in order to render temporary “assistance or protection.”41
Rather than characterize humanitarian intervention as an exercise in punitive
law enforcement, Grotius asserts that the law of nature permits intervening
states to exercise an oppressed people’s natural rights of collective self-defense
on their behalf. Under Grotius’s account of the law of nations, subjects’ duty
of fealty to their sovereign means that they lack the legal capacity to redress
any mistreatment they may suffer at the hands of their sovereign by force.42
This does not, however, leave subjects wholly without recourse. According
to Grotius, the legal incapacity that prevents an oppressed people from taking
up arms against their sovereign “is of a personal nature”; it is not “inherent
in the nature of the action itself.” Hence, the duties of fidelity that preclude
subjects from taking up arms against their sovereign do not necessarily
preclude other powers from interceding on their behalf. Just as the law permits
a guardian to undertake an action for a ward, which the ward lacks legal
capacity to do for himself, intervening states could take up arms to exercise
an oppressed people’s natural right to protect themselves collectively from
cruel mistreatment.43 Thus, under Grotius’s guardianship theory, humanitarian
intervention constitutes a fiduciary relationship in which a state undertakes to
represent the people of another state for the purpose of conducting collective
self-defense on their behalf and for their benefit.
Grotius’s choice of guardianship as a model for humanitarian intervention
was hardly unprecedented. Nearly a century earlier, Francisco de Vitoria had
invoked the guardian-ward relationship in his 1532 lecture On the Indians
Lately Discovered to explain the circumstances in which the law of nations
would permit European states to impose colonial rule in the Americas. Vitoria
argued that indigenous peoples in the Americas, being endowed with reason
and moral agency, “had true dominion in both public and private matters,
just like Christians, and . . . neither their princes nor private persons could
be despoiled of their property on the ground of their not being true owners.”44
Nonetheless, Spanish conquest of the Americas might be justified if first nations
40
41
42
43
44

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Francisco de Vitoria, On the Indians Lately Discovered, in De Indis et de Ivre
Belli Relectiones 128 (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bate trans., 1917).

Theoretical Inquiries in Law 16.2 (2015)

484

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 16:473

violated the natural rights of their Spanish visitors or engaged in “tyrannical
and oppressive acts” such as human sacrifice or cannibalism against their own
people.45 In such cases, other states could intervene as benevolent guardians
to guarantee basic security and fundamental rights, subject to a fiduciary
obligation to use the power thus conferred for the benefit of the indigenous
people. For both Vitoria and Grotius, the fiduciary structure of guardianship
offered an intelligible legal and moral framework for humanitarian intervention.
Whenever any state ruptured its own fiduciary relationship with its own people
through acts of intolerable cruelty, international law entrusted authority to
other states to stand in as temporary fiduciaries for the oppressed people for
the purpose of exercising a natural right of self-defense on their behalf.
The guardianship theory developed by Vitoria and Grotius highlights salient
features of the juridical structure of humanitarian intervention. In private law,
fiduciary relationships are generally understood to arise when one party (the
fiduciary) undertakes to exercise discretionary power over the legal or practical
interests of another (the beneficiary).46 Within such relationships, the law
obligates the fiduciary to exercise the beneficiary’s legal rights on her behalf
and for her benefit. Central to Grotius’s theory of humanitarian intervention is
his argument that the natural law of humanitarian intervention bears a similar
formal structure: whenever one state ruptures its own fiduciary relationship
with its people, other states possess a residual fiduciary authority to protect
foreign nationals, exercising foreign nationals’ rights of self-defense on their
behalf. Like private-law fiduciaries such as guardians, agents, and trustees,
states that engage in humanitarian intervention stand in a legal relationship
wherein they are required to use their entrusted powers (the use of force) for
a prescribed purpose (defensive action to prevent grave human rights abuse),
acting in what they perceive to be the best interests of their beneficiaries (a
foreign people).47 Thus, in Grotius’s view, natural law entrusts states with
authority as joint-guardians for humanity to defend foreign nationals who
suffer under unconscionable abuse at the hands of their own sovereign.
45 Id. at 159.
46 See Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Remedies, 63 U. Toronto L.J. 570
(2013).
47 There is some debate in the literature as to whether fiduciaries are required to
act in a manner that is objectively in the best interests of their beneficiaries or
what they perceive to be their beneficiaries’ best interests. See Stephen R. Galoob
& Ethan J. Leib, Intentions, Compliance, and Fiduciary Obligation, 20 Legal
Theory 106 (2014); Lionel Smith, Fiduciary Obligations: Ensuring the Loyal
Exercise of Judgment on Behalf of Another, 130 L.Q. Rev. 608 (2014). I use
the latter formulation here, though the argument developed in this Article does
not depend upon the distinction.
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Notwithstanding its virtues as an interpretivist theory of humanitarian
intervention, Grotius’s guardianship theory has several serious weaknesses
as applied to contemporary international law. First, the theory is based on
controversial natural-law premises. Like Grotius’s account of a universal
right to punish, the guardianship theory contemplates the existence and
jurisprudential authority of a universal law of “right reason”48 — a premise
that has fallen out of fashion in an era dominated by international legal
positivism and normative pluralism.49 To be sure, natural-law accounts of
humanitarian intervention have not disappeared entirely from international
legal discourse.50 For example, George Fletcher and Jens Ohlin have argued
recently that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter preserves and codifies a naturallaw right for states to use force on their own independent initiative for the
“legitimate defense” (légitime défense) of human rights victims abroad.51 Most
experts, however, reject the idea that the Charter’s recognition of an “inherent
right of self-defense” contemplates unilateral humanitarian intervention.52
Moreover, although some legal scholars have advocated recognizing a new
norm of unilateral humanitarian intervention following the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 1999 intervention to protect ethnic Albanians
in Kosovo,53 this proposal has not attracted sufficient support in state practice
and opinio juris to generate customary international law.54 Hence, even those
who support Kosovo-style interventions tend to defend this idea based on
appeals to “justice” and respect for “human dignity” rather than international
law.55 The dominant view among international lawyers today, therefore, is
48 Grotius, supra note 2, bk. I, ch. 1, pt. X.
49 See generally Hollis, supra note 32.
50 See, e.g., William C. Bradford, “The Duty to Defend Them”: A Natural Legal
Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1365 (2004); Michael J. Glennon, The New Interventionism: The Search for
a Just International Law, 73 Foreign Aff. 2 (1999); Jens David Ohlin, The
Doctrine of Legitimate Defense, 91 Int’l L. Stud. 119 (2015).
51 See George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Defending Humanity: When Force
Is Justified and Why (2008); Ohlin, supra note 50.
52 See, e.g., Saira Mohamed, Restructuring the Debate on Unauthorized Humanitarian
Intervention, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 1275, 1285-89 (2010); Bruno Simma, NATO, the
UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1, 3 (1999).
53 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Limits of “Humanitarian Intervention,”
93 Am. J. Int’l L. 824, 825 (1999).
54 See Oona A. Hathaway et al., Consent-Based Humanitarian Intervention: Giving
Sovereign Responsibility Back to the Sovereign, 46 Cornell Int’l L.J. 499,
521-35 (2013).
55 See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 50.
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that international law prohibits states from unilaterally declaring themselves
the guardians of foreign peoples for the purpose of undertaking unilateral
humanitarian intervention on their behalf.56
Second, any serious effort to translate Grotius’s guardianship theory for
contemporary international law must come to grips with its dismal historical
legacy. Although Vitoria and Grotius introduced the guardianship theory as
a framework for safeguarding foreign nationals from domination, Western
nations quickly pressed the theory into service as a justification for precisely
the opposite purpose: the global expansion of European colonialism and the
systematic exploitation of foreign peoples. As Robert Williams has explained,
the guardianship concept “provided Western legal discourse with its first
secularly oriented, systematized elaboration of the superior rights of civilized
Europeans to invade and conquer normatively divergent peoples.”57 Over
time, fiduciary concepts have also supplied a justificatory framing narrative
for consolidating and perpetuating power, as European states invoked their
“imperious humanitarian duty” to protect vulnerable peoples from the Ottoman
Empire during the nineteenth century58 and maintained control over former
colonies as “mandates” or “trusteeships” in the twentieth century.59 In recognition
of this troubling history, critics have argued that the guardianship theory of
humanitarian intervention serves only to dress up might as right, cementing
geopolitical inequality as juridical inequality and thereby facilitating powerful
states’ neo-imperialist ambitions.60
At the close of his discussion of humanitarian intervention in On the Law
of War and Peace, Grotius frankly acknowledges the risk that states may
56 See id. at 542-67. A stronger argument can be made that customary international
law authorizes states to use countermeasures such as trade restrictions and asset
freezes in response to grave human rights abuse abroad. See Evan J. Criddle,
Standing for Human Rights Abroad, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 269 (2015).
57 Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought:
The Discourses of Conquest 106 (1992).
58 Davide Rodogno, Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the
Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914, at 12, 63-117 (2012); see also Stephen C. Neff,
War and the Law of Nations: A General History 224 (2005) (quoting Note
to the Porte, 8 Apr. 1830, in Concert of Europe 121 (René Albrecht-Carrié ed.,
1968)).
59 See League of Nations Covenant art. 22 (mandates); U.N. Charter arts. 75-91
(trusteeships).
60 See Linda Alcoff, The Problem of Speaking for Others, 20 Cultural Critique
5 (1991) (“[T]he practice of privileged persons speaking for or on behalf of
less privileged persons has actually resulted (in many cases) in increasing or
reinforcing the oppression of the group spoken for.”).
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abuse the power reposed in them. Nonetheless, he insists that the potential
for abuse does not necessarily undermine the legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention generally:
We know . . . from both ancient and modern history, that the desire for
what is another’s seeks such pretexts as this for its own ends; but a right
does not at once cease to exist in case it is to some extent abused by
evil men. Pirates also sail the sea; arms are carried also by brigands.61
This defense of the guardianship theory rings hollow today. If centuries
of experience have taught us anything, it is that “pirates” and “brigands” are
no less likely than saints to invoke the “right” to humanitarian intervention.62
Moreover, even interventions that begin with the best of intentions ultimately
may engender a form of foreign domination that undermines self-determination.
Hence, Grotius’s suggestion that each state may decide for itself whether to
engage in humanitarian intervention carries too great a potential for abuse to
serve as a model for twenty-first century international law.
In sum, Grotius’s theory of humanitarian intervention as a form of legal
guardianship has some features that are attractive and others that should
give any sober observer pause. On the one hand, the idea that intervening
states serve as fiduciaries illuminates the juridical structure of humanitarian
intervention in a manner that highlights states’ other-regarding obligations to
use their power for the benefit of human rights-holders. On the other hand,
Grotius’s guardianship theory rests on natural-law premises that no longer
command general acceptance as an independent legal basis for humanitarian
intervention. Furthermore, the fact that the guardianship theory has greased the
wheels for colonialist exploitation suggests that the theory is too susceptible
to abuse. Even if Grotius’s theory captures important features of the juridical
structure of humanitarian intervention, it is doubtful that it can be rehabilitated
and deployed in a manner that would advance the normative commitments
of twenty-first century international society.

III. The Fiduciary Theory of Humanitarian Intervention
This Part outlines a new fiduciary theory of humanitarian intervention that
better explains the legal basis, purpose, and scope of state authority to protect
human rights abroad. This theory takes as its point of departure Grotius’s
61 Grotius, supra note 2, bk. II, ch. 25, pt. VIII.
62 See Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 Am.
J. Int’l L. 107 (2006) (observing that Hitler offered humanitarian arguments
“as a pretext for his incursions into Austria and Czechoslovakia”).
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claim that under some circumstances states may use force abroad as temporary
fiduciaries for foreign nationals who risk grievous abuse at the hands of
their own sovereign.63 Although the fiduciary theory owes a significant debt
to Grotius, it does not rely upon Grotius’s controversial view that states
have authority under natural law to use force unilaterally to protect foreign
nationals abroad. Instead, the theory proposed uses the fiduciary character
of humanitarian intervention as an interpretive framework to explain the
character and limits of humanitarian intervention at a time when the Security
Council bears exclusive responsibility under the U.N. Charter for authorizing
humanitarian intervention without a target state’s consent.
At first glance, the Charter’s collective-security regime might easily be
misconstrued as a wholesale repudation of Grotius’s theories of humanitarian
intervention. After all, the most striking feature of Grotius’s theories of
international punishment and humanitarian intervention is the idea that states
have authority to act unilaterally under natural law. Conversely, the Charter is
generally understood to prohibit the unilateral use of force, except in settings
where states are compelled to defend their own people from armed attacks.64
States do not, in fact, have a general license to use force abroad unilaterally
as agents of global law enforcement (the punishment theory) or as jointfiduciaries for the protection of humanity (the guardianship theory). Despite
these fundamental differences, however, Grotius’s writings on humanitarian
intervention cannot be so easily dismissed, for several reasons.
First, as discussed previously, even if the Charter prevents states from relying
on a natural right of humanitarian intervention, Grotius’s characterization of
humanitarian intervention as a fiduciary relationship remains fundamentally
sound today. As Grotius adroitly recognized, humanitarian intervention bears
the distinguishing features of a fiduciary relationship; namely, the entrustment
of discretionary power over another person’s legal interests.65 The discretionary
powers that states exercise during lawful humanitarian intervention derive
from the confluence of two sources: (1) an oppressed people’s legal right to
defend themselves against grave human rights abuse,66 and (2) the Security
Council’s power under the Charter to authorize action to restore international

63 Grotius, supra note 2, bk. II, ch. 20, pt. VIII.
64 U.N. Charter art. 51. But see Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 51; Ohlin, supra
note 50.
65 See Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in Philosophical Foundations
of Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at 63 (2014).
66 See Ohlin, supra note 50; Jordan J. Paust, International Law, Dignity, Democracy,
and the Arab Spring, 46 Cornell Int’l L.J. 1, 12-14 (2013).
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peace and security.67 When states exercise authority entrusted to them by
the Security Council for the protection of human rights victims abroad, the
powers they exercise are not their own; rather, these powers are held in a
fiduciary capacity to be exercised for the exclusive benefit of a foreign people.68
Grotius’s fiduciary conception thus accurately captures the juridical structure
of humanitarian intervention.
Viewed from this perspective, the relational character of an intervening
state’s authority to use force comes into clearer focus. As in other fiduciary
relationships, the legal authority that intervening states exercise during
humanitarian intervention is other-regarding, purposive, and institutional.69
The authority is other-regarding in the straightforward sense that it is legally
capable of being exercised only for the benefit of a foreign people, not to
advance the self-regarding interests of the intervening state. It is purposive
in the sense that it is limited to humanitarian objectives, as specified by the
Security Council. And it is institutional in that it generates an institutional
relationship between states or regional organizations and the people they seek
to protect. This institutional relationship is closely analogous to fiduciary
relationships involving court-appointed guardians, successor trustees, and
representative plaintiffs in shareholder derivative litigation. In each of these
settings, the abuse of power by one fiduciary activates another fiduciary’s
subsidiary authority to protect the interests of their shared beneficiaries.70

See Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect 63 (2009) (identifying Kofi Annan
and Francis Deng as proponents of this approach); Anne Orford, International
Authority and the Responsibility to Protect 34 (2011) (describing humanitarian
intervention as “international executive rule”); Terry Nardin, Introduction,
in Humanitarian Intervention: Nomos XLVII 1, 18-21 (2006) (considering
humanitarian intervention as an exercise in law enforcement).
68 While a guardian may be thought to exercise a form of parens patriae power
by delegation on behalf of the state, this power relates to the ward’s legal or
practical interests, and the guardian’s fiduciary obligations therefore run to
the ward, not to the state itself. By the same token, even if states receive their
mandate to intervene from the Security Council, they hold this authority in a
fiduciary capacity and are required to exercise their authority for the benefit of
an oppressed people.
69 See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens,
34 Yale J. Int’l L. 331 (2009).
70 This account of the juridical basis for humanitarian countermeasures resonates
with Eyal Benvenisti’s vision of states as “trustees of humanity.” See Eyal
Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States
to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 295 (2013).
67
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The juridical structure of humanitarian intervention thus supports Grotius’s
argument that intervening states exercise authority as fiduciaries.
Second, requiring Security Council authorization for the use of force is
fully consistent with a fiduciary conception of humanitarian intervention.71 This
is true irrespective of whether the use of force in humanitarian intervention
is best understood as deriving from an oppressed people’s collective right
of self-defense or from the Security Council’s power under the Charter “to
take such action . . . as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security.”72 Under both accounts, Security Council approval serves
as the mechanism for entrusting authority to states to intercede in defense of
an oppressed people for their benefit. Just as individuals must obtain judicial
approval before they may serve as legal guardians for children who have
suffered abuse at the hands of their parents, the U.N. Charter requires states
to obtain Security Council approval before they may assume responsibility for
using force abroad to protect foreign nationals. This requirement of positive
authorization marks a significant departure from Grotius’s original naturalist
theory, but it is fully consistent with his insight that intervening states stand
in a fiduciary relationship with the intended beneficiaries of humanitarian
intervention.
Third, the fiduciary theory also clarifies the controversial R2P principle,
which suggests that when states are unable or unwilling to protect their own
people from grave human rights abuse, the international community as a

71

Since the early 1990s, the Security Council has authorized humanitarian intervention
on a number of occasions, including in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and Libya. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1973, ¶¶ 4, 8, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing air strikes to enforce a no-fly-zone
and prevent war crimes and crimes against humanity in Libya); S.C. Res. 1270,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999) (establishing the U.N. Mission in Sierra
Leone (UNAMSIL) to keep peace and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid);
S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (Sept. 15, 1999) (authorizing a multinational
force to restore peace in East Timor); S.C. Res. 758, U.N. Doc. S/RES/758 (June
8, 1992) (authorizing the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former
Yugoslavia to take steps to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo).
Although the Charter does not provide expressly for the Security Council to
authorize military intervention to prevent human rights abuses confined within
a single state’s borders, the international community has accepted this principle
as part of the Security Council’s authority “to maintain or restore international
peace and security” under U.N. Charter art. 42.
72 U.N. Charter art. 42.
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whole bears a subsidiary responsibility to furnish protection and assistance.73
Proponents of R2P argue that the international community may satisfy R2P
in most settings by providing material assistance and training to strengthen
a state’s capacity to protect its own people. When such measures prove to be
inadequate, however, the international community may use force to prevent
large-scale human rights disasters such as those that unfolded in Rwanda
and Darfur.74
Over time, the U.N. Security Council, the Secretary General, and the General
Assembly have all expressed support for R2P, affirming that individual states
and the international community collectively are assigned complementary roles
in preventing mass atrocities.75 Nonetheless, R2P continues to stir debate among
international lawyers and political theorists. Some critics have faulted R2P for
assigning protective responsibility to the nebulous “international community”
without specifying what obligations and authority, if any, particular states
and international organizations have to protect human rights abroad.76 Other
scholars have argued that R2P has little direct relevance for international law,
because it is merely an expression of the international community’s collective
political commitment to guaranteeing human security rather than a binding
legal obligation to take action in response to humanitarian crises.77
73 See, e.g., Int’l Comm. on Intervention & State Sovereignty, The Responsibility
to Protect 13, ¶ 2.15 (2001) (“[S]tate authorities are responsible for the functions
of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare.”);
Francis M. Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management
in Africa, at xii, xvii (1996) (characterizing the international community as
“the ultimate guarantor of the universal standards that safeguard the rights of
all human beings”); Catherine Powell, Libya: A Multilateral Constitutional
Moment?, 106 Am. J. Int’l L. 298 (2012).
74 See World Summit Outcome, supra note 11, ¶ 139.
75 See Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, Economist (Sept. 18 1999),
http://www.economist.com/node/324795; U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing
the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009); World Summit
Outcome, supra note 11, ¶¶ 138-39; S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970
(Feb. 26, 2011); S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 71; S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
76 See, e.g., James Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility
to Protect: Who Should Intervene? 4 (2010); William W. Burke-White, The
Adoption of the Responsibility To Protect, in The Responsibility to Protect:
The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time 17 (Jared Gensler &
Irwin Cotler eds., 2011).
77 See, e.g., Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect: A Defense 13-14
(2015); Aiden Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect: Sound and Fury Signifying
Nothing, 24 Int’l Rel. 218, 218-19, 234-35 (2010).
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The fiduciary theory reorients R2P in a manner that irons out some of
the wrinkles in contemporary debates. The fiduciary theory suggests that
R2P does have legal significance, because the principle affirms that human
rights protection does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of national
authorities.78 International institutions such as the Security Council also
serve as indirect guardians of humanity with authority to take action when
states do not honor their fiduciary obligations to their people. Rather than
encumber the Security Council or the “international community as a whole”
with an affirmative duty to intervene, however, R2P operates primarily as a
power-conferring gloss on the U.N. Charter, affirming the Security Council’s
authority to approve humanitarian intervention by U.N. member-states over
a target state’s objections.79 When mass atrocities prompt calls for military
action, the responsibility to provide direct protection is assumed voluntarily
by states and regional organizations that are entrusted with this authority by
the Security Council.80 Just as an individual must consent to serve as guardian
for a ward or a trustee for beneficiaries, states and regional organizations
are under no legal obligation to place their armed forces in harm’s way to
protect a foreign people from their own government.81 Once a state or regional
organization voluntarily assumes this responsibility as a direct guardian for
an oppressed people abroad, however, the fiduciary theory supports the idea
78 See Bellamy, supra note 77, at 95 (observing that prior to the 2011 NATO
intervention in Libya, humanitarian interventions authorized by the Security
Council had always received the target state’s consent).
79 See Orford, supra note 67, at 25-26 (arguing that R2P is best understood as a
power-conferring rule rather than a duty-imposing rule). The fiduciary theory is
compatible, however, with the idea that the Security Council bears an affirmative
obligation to authorize intervention when necessary and appropriate to prevent
an imminent humanitarian crisis. Cf. Anna Spain, The U.N. Security Council’s
Duty to Decide, 4 Harv. Nat’l Security J. 320 (2013) (arguing that the Security
Council should be charged with an affirmative, quasi-judicial “duty to decide”).
80 Although the U.N. Charter originally provided for states by “special agreement”
to contribute “armed forces, assistance, and facilities” for a standing international
security force under the Security Council’s command, see U.N. Charter art. 43,
this provision has remained dormant. U.N. agencies have played a more direct
role, however, in helping states and regional organizations to develop and sustain
the capacity for durable human rights protection through peacekeeping and other
missions. See Orford, supra note 67, at 209 (arguing that U.N. peacekeeping
operations represent the paradigm case for R2P).
81 See Grotius, supra note 2, bk. II, ch. 20, pt. VII. But see Monica Hakimi, Toward
a Legal Theory of the Responsibility To Protect, 39 Yale J. Int’l L. 247 (2014)
(arguing that some states may assume responsibility to intervene abroad based
on their contribution to humanitarian crises).
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that intervening forces must use their entrusted power in a manner that is
consistent with the R2P principle. In each of these respects, the fiduciary
theory helpfully disentangles R2P’s legal and political dimensions.
The Security Council’s 2011 resolution authorizing humanitarian intervention
in Libya offers the clearest illustration of the fiduciary theory in action. While
“reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility
to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians,” the Security
Council concluded that international intervention was warranted to address the
Libyan government’s indiscriminate attacks against civilians.82 The Security
Council therefore authorized “Member States that have notified the SecretaryGeneral, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements,
and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary
measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat
of attack.”83 The Security Council thus entrusted states with authority to use
force in a fiduciary capacity for the limited purpose of defending civilians
in Libya from war crimes and crimes against humanity. With this mandate
in hand, NATO countries commenced a campaign of air strikes and cruise
missile attacks to prevent the Libyan government from perpetrating further
human rights abuses.84
Requiring international authorization for humanitarian intervention provides
an important institutional check against powerful states proclaiming themselves
the rightful “guardians” for foreign peoples and using force without adequate
justification.85 But is this requirement sufficient to ensure that humanitarian
intervention will be used only where strictly necessary and in a manner that
is faithful to the interests of an oppressed people? Surely not. Once authority
for intervention has been conferred upon a state or group of states, further
checks are needed to hedge against the risk of abuse. These checks should be
carefully calibrated to promote accountability without unduly constraining
intervening states’ capacity for effective action.
Although enthusiasts of the R2P doctrine have pointed to the NATO-led
intervention in Libya as a promising example of U.N.-authorized humanitarian
intervention,86 it also serves as a cautionary tale. NATO intervention may
82 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 71, pmbl.
83 Id. pmbl. ¶¶ 4-8.
84 Libya: US, UK and France Attack Gaddafi Forces, BBC News (Mar. 20, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12796972.
85 See Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis
in Darfur and Humanitarianism After Iraq, 19 Ethics & Int’l Aff. 31 (2005)
(observing that the 2003 Iraq War undermined the credibility of the United
States and the United Kingdom as agents for humanitarian intervention).
86 See, e.g., Powell, supra note 73.
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have averted massive civilian casualties in some areas of Libya,87 but NATO
members soon expanded the operation in ways that extended far beyond their
mandate from the Security Council. By supplying arms and other assistance
to rebel militia groups and by targeting Libyan forces and infrastructure
that were not involved in attacks against civilians, the NATO-led mission
decisively shifted the balance of power in Libya’s civil war, paving the way
for regime change.88 NATO also flouted the Security Council’s express call
for a negotiated solution to the crisis by rebuffing the Libyan regime’s efforts
to negotiate.89 While scholars might debate whether NATO’s efforts to bolster
the Libyan insurgency advanced the interests of the Libyan people in the
long run, there can be little doubt that in a variety of respects NATO forces
exceeded the scope of their mandate from the Security Council.
The Libya intervention thus poses an important challenge to the fiduciary
theory. For the fiduciary theory to have credibility, it is critical that international
law regulate not only who may engage in humanitarian intervention, but also
how they may do so.90 And the international community needs to develop
more effective procedures for holding states accountable when they abuse
their entrusted authority during humanitarian intervention.

IV. Operationalizing the Fiduciary Theory
This Part proposes three specific measures to make the fiduciary theory of
humanitarian intervention more credible in practice. First, intervening states
must respect a foreign people’s right to self-determination by making goodfaith efforts to consult with and respect the actual preferences of the people for
whose benefit they purport to act. Second, states that engage in humanitarian
intervention must use force in a manner that respects the requirements of
international human rights law (IHRL), including the heightened proportionality
requirements associated with the human “right to life.”91 Third, the Security
Council must become a more effective oversight body for humanitarian
intervention, not only with respect to the Security Council’s oft-criticized
decision-making structure, but also with respect to how the Security Council
designs its authorizing resolutions ex ante and supervises intervention ex
See Bellamy, supra note 77, at 187.
Id. at 187-89.
Id. at 187.
See id. at 189 (discussing Brazil’s proposal for a new “responsibility while
protecting” principle that would focus attention on the international community’s
responsibilities during implementation of R2P).
91 ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 6.1.

87
88
89
90
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post. These three proposals are not meant to be exhaustive; other reforms will
surely be needed to fully operationalize the fiduciary theory of humanitarian
intervention. Nonetheless, these proposals illustrate how the fiduciary theory
might enhance the normative coherence and legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention in practice.
A. The Duty of Deliberative Engagement
A major weakness of Grotius’s guardianship model for humanitarian intervention
is that it treats human rights-holders as mere passive objects of state concern,
not as autonomous agents whose idiosyncratic values and preferences are
entitled to respect. As discussed previously, critics have observed that the
paternalistic character of humanitarian intervention raises “the spectre of
potential neo-colonialism.”92 In response to these concerns, advocates of the
R2P doctrine have argued that the international community needs to consider
“the problem from the victim’s point of view” and focus “on rebuilding
[humanitarian intervention] around local empowerment.”93 Thus, the R2P
movement has endeavored to shift the international community’s attention
away from international military action toward measures that can be taken
before a crisis arises to strengthen states’ commitment and capacity to respect
and protect human rights.
Less attention has been paid to what it would mean for states to consider
“the victim’s point of view” when they contemplate military intervention.
Taking seriously the victim’s point of view could simply mean that states must
give due regard to how military intervention would impact foreign nationals’
legitimate, legally protected interests. At a minimum, states might engage in
reasoned deliberation to determine whether military intervention would serve
the best interests of a foreign people, taking into account factors such as the
impact that military intervention would likely have upon human security,
infrastructure, and economic development within the target state.94 This
approach is consistent with a fiduciary theory of humanitarian intervention,
92 Bellamy, supra note 77, at 43.
93 Id. at 43-44 (describing the approach of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty).
94 This approach resonates with Edmund Burke’s much-criticized trusteeship
conception of political representation, wherein a “natural aristocracy” would
determine what policies and programs would best advance the interests of their
constituents. Edmund Burke, The French Revolution, in Burke’s Politics:
Selected Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke on Reform, Revolution,
and War 277, 397-98 (Ross J.S. Hoffman & Paul Levack eds., 1949) (1770).
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because the duties of loyalty and care require fiduciaries to consider and
prioritize the best interests of their beneficiaries.
Alternatively, taking the victim’s point of view could mean that an
intervening state must endeavor to ascertain and honor the actual preferences
of their beneficiaries. Many fiduciary relationships such as agent-principal
and lawyer-client require fiduciaries to consult with their beneficiaries and
follow their actual preferences when critical decisions arise.95 These fiduciary
relationships, which seek to empower beneficiaries to control their fiduciaries’
performance, arguably provide a better model for humanitarian intervention
than Grotius’s guardianship analogy. As David Ponet and Ethan Leib have
observed, fiduciary law contains “a constellation of obligations that can be
read to require ‘deliberative engagement.’”96 These obligations of deliberative
engagement include the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which dictates that beneficiaries
must give informed consent to any conflicts of interest.97 The duty of care
likewise requires public fiduciaries to “consult with and deliberatively engage
constituents as part of the process of rationally considering their preferences
and assessing the full panoply of potential courses of action within the public
fiduciary’s authorization.”98 In the context of humanitarian intervention, these
deliberative features of fiduciary law underscore the idea that intervening
states must demonstrate solicitude for the actual values and preferences
of the foreign peoples they purport to represent. For example, a plausible
implication of the fiduciary theory is that states may not conduct military
intervention without Security Council authorization unless they have sought
human rights victims’ consent to foreign assistance, and they should not use
force if such measures would be inconsistent with the express preferences
of the human rights-holders whom they purport to represent. Thus, a serious
effort to respect the preferences of a foreign people is arguably required by
the idea of “taking the victim’s point of view.”

95 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 cmt. f (2005) (“An essential
element of agency is the principal’s right to control the agent’s actions.”);
Carol A. Needham, Advance Consent to Aggregate Settlements: Reflections
on Attorneys’ Fiduciary Obligations and Professional Responsibility Duties,
44 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 511, 514 (2012) (observing that a lawyer’s duty of loyalty
includes obligations to “communicate effectively with the client regarding the
representation, and consult with the client regarding the matters essential to the
representation” (citations omitted)).
96 David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative
Democracy, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1207, 1215 (2011).
97 Id. at 1215-16.
98 Id. at 1216-17.

Theoretical Inquiries in Law 16.2 (2015)

2015]

Three Grotian Theories of Humanitarian Intervention

497

This requirement of deliberative engagement resonates with similar
requirements in other fields of international law where states stand in fiduciary
relationships with their own citizens or foreign nationals. For example, the
U.N. International Law Commission has concluded that when states espouse
the claims of their nationals for the purpose of asserting legal claims on their
behalf, they must “take into account, wherever feasible, the views of injured
persons with regard to resort to diplomatic protection and the reparation to be
sought.”99 Likewise, the international law of indigenous rights, another regime
that has been shaped by fiduciary concepts, obligates states to “consult and
cooperate in good faith with . . . indigenous peoples . . . through their own
representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed
consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative
measures that may affect them.”100 Whenever a state exercises public powers
on behalf of others, it bears a corresponding fiduciary obligation to ascertain
and respect the preferences of its beneficiaries.101
The requirement of deliberative engagement poses a nettlesome challenge
for humanitarian intervention, however, because it is often difficult for the
international community to find and access appropriate “representative
institutions” when a people faces a threat from their own state. Where a host
state seeks to commit crimes against humanity against a discrete and wellorganized political party, ethnic group, or religious community, identifying
99 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, art. 19(b), Int’l
Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. GAOR,
61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, A/61/10 (2006).
100 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 19, G.A. Res. 61/295,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007); cf. Saramaka People v. Suriname,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 134 (Nov. 28, 2007) (requiring
good-faith consultation and informed consent for large-scale development or
investment projects); Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries (Convention No. 169), June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382
(providing that states must honor “the social, cultural, religious and spiritual
values and practices of [indigenous] peoples”; “consult the peoples concerned
. . . whenever consideration is being given to . . . measures which may affect
them directly”; and conduct these consultations “in good faith and in a form
appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement
or consent to the proposed measures”). See generally Evan Fox-Decent & Ian
Dahlman, Sovereignty as Trusteeship and Indigenous Peoples, 16 Theoretical
Inquiries L. 507 (2015).
101 For more detailed treatments of this principle, see Evan J. Criddle & Evan FoxDecent, International Law’s Fiduciary Constitution (forthcoming 2015); and
Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (2011).
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the appropriate opposition leaders for deliberative engagement may be a
relatively straightforward matter, and it is critical that intervening states obtain
these representatives’ free and informed consent for military intervention. If
representatives of an oppressed group request the modification or discontinuation
of humanitarian intervention, intervening states should make every effort to
respect these requests, provided that they can do so within the constraints of
the Security Council’s relevant resolutions.
Conversely, where a vulnerable group lacks effective representation,
deliberative engagement may prove to be a more complex challenge. In the
current Syrian civil war, for example, it is unclear which antigovernment
factions, if any, best represent the values and preferences of Syrians whose
lives have been jeopardized by the Assad regime’s war crimes and crimes
against humanity. In such settings, the duty of deliberative engagement would
require intervening states to make public their proposed action with a statement
of the humanitarian rationale for intervention. Intervening states would also
bear a responsibility to engage a broad spectrum of stakeholders in order
to make a fully informed and rational decision that reflects due regard for
the interests of all. Irrespective of the setting, intervening states must create
spaces for foreign nationals to contest whether and how intervening states
may use force on their behalf.102
The fiduciary theory’s requirements of deliberative engagement mark an
important advance over Grotius’s punishment and guardianship theories of
humanitarian intervention, which commit enforcement to the intervening
state’s unilateral discretion. To the extent that states intervene on behalf of
others, they bear a fiduciary obligation to proceed deliberatively, seeking
out and giving due regard to the preferences of their intended beneficiaries.
B. The Human Right to Life
The fiduciary theory also has important implications for how states use
force when they conduct humanitarian intervention. In particular, because
international law entrusts intervening states with authority to use force for the
benefit of an oppressed people, intervening states bear a fiduciary obligation
to observe human rights standards for the use of force whenever they engage
in humanitarian intervention.103
102 See Robert H. Sitkoff & Jesse Dukeminier, Wills, Trusts & Estates 653, 65758 (9th ed. 2013) (observing that the “duty of impartiality” in trust law requires
“due regard” to the beneficiaries’ respective interests).
103 Elsewhere I have argued that the fiduciary character of a state’s relationship
with its own people and foreign peoples under its authority also requires the
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In recent years, an energetic debate has arisen among legal scholars
concerning how standards from IHRL and international humanitarian law
(IHL) interact during armed conflict.104 International human rights tribunals
and the International Court of Justice have become increasingly receptive to
the idea that human rights norms apply during armed conflict, creating areas of
jurisdictional overlap and potential normative conflict.105 For example, IHRL
and IHL offer distinct accounts of who may be targeted and the circumstances
in which lethal forced may be used. Under the IHL principle of distinction, a
state in armed conflict need not establish that any particular enemy combatant
poses an imminent threat to their own security; the mere fact that an enemy
combatant has taken direct part in hostilities against the state is sufficient to
qualify them as a legitimate target for the use of lethal force.106 IHL’s “principle
of proportionality in attack”107 provides that states are free to conduct attacks
that are “expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,” as long as such collateral
damage is not manifestly “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.”108
IHRL standards for the use of force are considerably more restrictive,
both with respect to who may be targeted and the type of force that may be
employed. The human “right to life” prohibits states from using lethal force
unless they can show that this measure is “absolutely necessary” to protect

104
105

106

107
108

application of human rights constraints on the use of force. See Evan J. Criddle,
Proportionality in Counterinsurgency: A Relational Theory, 87 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1073 (2012).
See, e.g., International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights
Law (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011) (providing a useful survey of these debates).
See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 178 (July 9); Isayeva
v. Russia, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 39 (2005); Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Merits
and Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70, ¶ 209 (Nov. 25, 2000).
See Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Additional Protocol
I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 40-41, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter API].
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law
Rules ch. 4, rule 14 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds.,
2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1.
API, supra note 106, art. 51(5)(b).
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human life or legal order.109 States must take precautions to avoid or minimize
casualties “to the greatest extent possible,”110 and they may use lethal force
only if nonlethal measures such as arrest or incapacitation would be likely to
impose disproportionate injury.111 Moreover, IHRL’s proportionality principle
requires states to consider all potential casualties — lawful combatants,
noncombatant fighters, and ordinary citizens alike — when planning and
executing operations that involve the use of force,112 whereas military casualties
are irrelevant to IHL’s proportionality inquiry.113 By limiting the use of lethal
force and extending this constraint to all human beings, combatants and
noncombatants alike, IHRL permits states to use force under a significantly
narrower set of circumstances than IHL.
The fiduciary theory of humanitarian intervention suggests that IHRL’s
more restrictive standards for the use of force should apply whenever states
use force to protect the human rights of foreign nationals abroad. As fiduciaries
entrusted with the responsibility to protect human rights, intervening states
bear a special responsibility to avoid using force in a manner that exceeds this
mandate. In particular, the fiduciary character of the relationship between an
intervening state and a foreign people suggests that states must take care to
avoid inflicting any harm that is not strictly necessary to fulfill their entrusted
responsibility to guarantee basic security under the rule of law. Merely ensuring
that collateral injury to noncombatants is not “excessive” in relationship to an
intervening state’s military objectives is insufficient, given that the purpose of
humanitarian intervention is to protect international human rights, which include
the right to life. Nor may an intervening state use lethal force against foreign
combatants unless such action is strictly necessary to prevent grave human
rights abuse. These requirements flow naturally from the fiduciary theory’s

109 See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 2(2), Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221;
McKerr v. United Kingdom, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 475, 516-17 ¶ 110 (2001);
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6, ¶¶ 3, 129, 16th Sess., 37
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 40), U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982).
110 Isayeva, 41 Eur. Ct. ¶ 175.
111 See, e.g., Khatsiyeva v. Russia, App. No. 5108/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).
112 See David S. Koller, The Moral Imperative: Toward a Human Rights-Based Law
of War, 46 Harv. Int’l L.J. 231, 260-61 (2005); Kenneth Watkin, Controlling
the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed
Conflict, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 32 (2004).
113 See Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International
Armed Conflict 129 (2d ed. 2010) (“Proportionality has nothing to do with
injury to combatants or damage to military objectives.”).
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formal legal requirement that states conducting humanitarian intervention must
treat foreign nationals always as equal beneficiaries of their coercive power.114
Under the fiduciary theory, intervening states may assume human rights
obligations toward foreign nationals even if they do not exercise effective
control over foreign territory. The assumption of coercive power over foreign
territory as fiduciary for foreign nationals is sufficient to trigger the obligation
to respect human rights.
This principle has not been uniformly accepted, despite the fact that the
two clearest examples of multilateral humanitarian intervention from the past
fifteen years, Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011), both involved humanitarian
airstrikes without intervening states “putting boots on the ground.” In the 2001
case Bankovic v. Belgium, the European Court of Human Rights considered
whether this type of intervention triggered state responsibility under the
European Convention on Human Rights.115 At issue in the case was a NATO
airstrike against television and radio production facilities in Belgrade that
had claimed sixteen lives and seriously wounded an equal number of others.116
Emphasizing the contractual character of the European Convention, the Court
held that the airstrike did not fall within the Convention’s scope, because the
intervening states lacked “effective control of the relevant territory and its
inhabitants.”117
The fiduciary theory, in contrast, suggests that states conducting humanitarian
intervention assume human rights obligations toward foreign nationals regardless
of whether or not they obtain effective control over a foreign people or foreign
territory. More consistent with the fiduciary theory is an alternative approach
that the Court articulated several years later in Issa v. Turkey: if a state claims
“authority” over foreign people or territory (as during humanitarian intervention)
the heightened requirements of IHRL apply.118 Respect for human rights is
a requirement that accompanies any use of force by a state that purports
to engage in humanitarian intervention. An important contribution of the
114 But see Jeff McMahan, The Just Distribution of Harm Between Combatants
and Noncombatants, 38 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 342, 359-61 (2010) (arguing that
the beneficiaries of military action may be subjected to greater harm than other
persons because “the risks of defensive action ought to be borne by those who
stand to benefit from” measures that are designed to reduce their overall risk of
harm).
115 Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 346 ¶ 34 (posing the question
whether mere airstrikes entailed an exercise of “jurisdiction” under Article 1 of
the European Convention).
116 Id. at 340-41 ¶¶ 9-11.
117 Id. at 355 ¶ 71, 358-59 ¶ 80.
118 Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 567 ¶ 72 (2004).
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fiduciary theory, therefore, is to call into question the idea that intervening
states may treat humanitarian intervention as ordinary international armed
conflict, subject to IHL’s general principles of distinction, necessity, and
proportionality. Whenever states conduct humanitarian intervention (with or
without a host state’s consent), they assume a correlative obligation to use
force in a manner that fully respects the human right to life.
C. Security Council Oversight
Given the grave injustices that states have perpetrated against one another in
the name of humanitarian “guardianship,” robust international institutions are
essential to guarantee the fiduciary obligations associated with humanitarian
intervention. Requiring states to obtain approval from either the target state
itself or the Security Council when initiating humanitarian intervention
provides some assurance that intervening states will possess the capacity
and commitment to serve as faithful fiduciaries for foreign nationals. After
authority for humanitarian intervention has been entrusted to particular states,
continuing international review is necessary to ensure that the states do not
abuse their discretionary power for self-interested purposes. In short, the
fiduciary theory presupposes the existence of international institutions that are
capable of holding states accountable for violating their fiduciary obligations.
Unfortunately, the Security Council’s flawed decision-making structure
has compromised its ability to perform this function effectively. The Security
Council has often lacked the political will to approve intervention in response
to even the most serious humanitarian crises. Moreover, because the Security
Council’s veto-wielding permanent members (P5) generally play key roles in
conducting U.N.-approved humanitarian interventions, the Security Council
is poorly equipped to curb interventions that exceed the scope of states’
entrusted authority. As reflected in the U.S.-led military actions in Iraq (2003)
and Libya (2011), narrowly tailored Security Council resolutions can easily be
reinterpreted as open-ended licenses for the use of force. Once a P5 state has
received a mandate for humanitarian intervention, this mandate is virtually
impossible to withdraw through a new resolution. This accountability deficit
has made it more difficult for states advocating humanitarian intervention
(chiefly, the United States and the United Kingdom) to persuade other P5
states (chiefly, China and Russia) to support Security Council resolutions
authorizing intervention. The accountability deficit also provides fodder for
critics who argue that the lofty rhetoric of “humanitarianism” and “fiduciary
duty” merely serves as a pretext for great-power domination. In the long run,
the Security Council will need to develop new and better ways to supervise
humanitarian intervention if the fiduciary theory is to be credible in practice.
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Pending more fundamental reform of the Security Council’s decisionmaking structure, some relatively modest changes could significantly narrow
the current accountability deficit. One commonsense reform, which Brazil has
proposed in the wake of NATO’s intervention in Libya, would be to establish
standardized reporting and review procedures to enable the Security Council
to continuously “monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are
implemented” and thereby provide for “the accountability of those to whom
authority is granted to resort to force.”119 The Security Council could also
establish its own independent monitoring body to investigate complaints that
intervening states have exceeded their mandates.120 While such oversight
procedures would require the Security Council to devote more resources to
monitoring and could risk further politicizing humanitarian interventions,121 the
requirement that intervening states provide a regular accounting for their use
of force flows directly from the fiduciary character of their entrusted authority.
A second option for enhancing Security Council oversight would be to
include a provision in future Security Council resolutions allowing the Security
Council or a separate committee composed of Security Council members
to narrow or withdraw mandates for humanitarian intervention by a simple
majority vote, narrowing the threat of a P5 veto. This mechanism could deter
states from undertaking humanitarian intervention in the first place by raising
the possibility that the Security Council could seek to micromanage their
military engagements or cancel a mission prematurely after an intervening
state has already committed significant resources. On the other hand, allowing
the Security Council to withdraw its mandate for humanitarian intervention
by a simple majority would help to counter the threat of “mission creep” by
enabling the Security Council to rein in intervening states that exceed the
scope of their entrusted authority.
Should this option prove impracticable, the Security Council could achieve
a similar result by adding “sunset provisions” — clauses that provide a fixed
expiration date — to resolutions that authorize humanitarian intervention.122 In
other settings, lawmakers have used sunset provisions to promote flexible and
responsive governance,123 and similar objectives could be achieved by requiring
119 Bellamy, supra note 77, at 192 (quoting Letter from the Permanent Representative
of Brazil, to the U.N. Secretary-General (Nov. 9, 2011)).
120 See id. at 201.
121 Id. at 199.
122 See id. at 200 (observing that sunset clauses are “standard practice for UN
peacekeeping operations”).
123 See Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset
Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 335, 337 (2006).
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states to seek periodic reauthorization for humanitarian intervention. While
the duration of the sunset period would obviously have to be calibrated to the
scope of the anticipated intervention, a sunset period in the range of sixty to
ninety days should give intervening states sufficient scope for action to avert
an impending humanitarian crisis (e.g., Kosovo, Libya), while preventing
the exigencies of the moment from generating an open-ended mandate for
a sustained foreign military presence in the target state. Requiring periodic
Security Council reauthorization would compel intervening states to account
for their performance, while also helping to ensure that their actions are
consistent with fiduciary principles of integrity, impartiality, and solicitude.
Should an intervening state abuse its discretion, the Security Council could
decline to renew its authorization for the use of force, or it could issue a revised
mandate that would define the humanitarian mission more precisely or transfer
responsibility for intervention to other states. The Security Council could also
establish U.N.-sponsored institutions to facilitate deliberative engagement
between intervening states and representatives of oppressed peoples. While
these are not the only conceivable mechanisms for enhancing international
accountability for humanitarian intervention, they are suggestive of the kinds
of sensible reforms that may help to address concerns about the fiduciary
theory’s potential for abuse.
Of course, these proposals for narrowing the accountability gap are premised
upon the idea that the Security Council itself can become a credible fiduciary
for humanity, and not merely a forum for Machiavellian political maneuvering
among the world’s most powerful states. Given the Security Council’s mixed
track record, there are valid grounds for skepticism about whether the Security
Council is up to the task.124 Yet the Security Council need not be directed by
angels to serve as an effective oversight body for humanitarian intervention.
The deep political divisions and mutual distrust that attend Security Council
decision-making may actually be a virtue if they can be channeled productively
to generate rigorous review of humanitarian interventions. Developing effective
mechanisms for post-authorization review could also make some P5 states
124 To the extent that the fiduciary theory depends on a well-functioning Security
Council, this is a serious weakness, though it is one that the fiduciary theory
shares with many other theories of humanitarian intervention, including those that
treat humanitarian intervention as a form of supranational executive action. See,
e.g., Bellamy, supra note 77, at 63 (observing that “both Francis Deng and Kofi
Annan admitted that sovereignty as responsibility implied that sovereigns should
be made accountable to a higher authority and that this required the creation of
a legitimate and representative global body,” but the Security Council “had to
become more efficient, representative, and accountable in order to [serve this
function]”).
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more willing to consider allowing humanitarian intervention in the future.
Thus, even if international law cannot exclude political bias from coloring the
Security Council’s decision-making process, there may be ways to harness
states’ self-interest in the service of the fiduciary theory’s emancipatory vision.

Conclusion
This Article has argued that legal scholars have been too quick to dismiss
Grotius’s contributions to the legal theory of humanitarian intervention.
Updated for the twenty-first century, Grotius’s characterization of humanitarian
intervention as a fiduciary relationship best explains how foreign military
intervention can facilitate human rights protection without unleashing new
forms of international domination. When states intervene to protect foreign
peoples from widespread and systematic abuse, they serve as fiduciaries,
exercising foreign peoples’ legal rights to self-defense on their behalf. By
framing humanitarian intervention within a relational legal framework, the
fiduciary theory ensures that international law regulates not only when states
may use force abroad to protect human rights, but also how they must do so.
Specifically, the fiduciary theory suggests that intervening states bear duties
of loyalty and care, which require them to use their entrusted powers for
the benefit of an oppressed people, including by respecting and protecting
human rights such as the right to life. The fiduciary theory also reconciles
foreign intervention with the principle of self-determination by requiring
intervening states to consult with and honor the preferences of the people on
whose behalf they purport to act. In these and other respects, the fiduciary
theory’s relational conception of humanitarian intervention clarifies the source
and character of intervening states’ authority to protect human rights abroad.
To make the fiduciary theory of humanitarian intervention fully operative in
practice, however, the international community must develop more robust
institutions and procedures for holding intervening states accountable for the
manner in which they exercise their entrusted powers.
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